Un3

North Atlantic

REGIONAL BRIEF

Western Security: The U.S. and Its NATO Allies

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

June 1989

After World War II, the people of Europe, free from the menace of Nazi Germany, were confronted with two distinctly different and opposing views of what the future should hold. The United States and its West European allies looked to an era of democracy underscored by individual freedoms and economic prosperity built on a foundation of free markets. With our allies, we stood fast against a contrary view championed by the Soviet Union—a view that forcibly divided Europe against the will of its peoples and which transformed it into the world's most heavily armed continent.

Indications that the Soviet Union—through *glasnost*, *perestroika*, democratization, and "new thinking"—is changing its vision of the future do not mean that the need for allied solidarity is over. We are viewing with interest and caution the changes in the Soviet Union. The United States welcomes *glasnost*, *perestroika*, new political thinking, and the first tentative steps toward democracy. However, the United States awaits tangible signs that the Soviets have changed their behavior on issues such as Soviet military expansion, forces acquisition and disposition, military doctrine, human rights, regional conflicts, and military support to totalitarian states before we can make fundamental changes in the allied approach to relations with the East.

Moreover, the former Soviet-inspired view of a Europe divided into ideological camps is not the only reason for Western alliances and friendships. Over the past four decades, the United States and its NATO allies have constructed strong political, military, and economic relationships bound together by shared values and fundamental common interests. Enormous changes have taken place among the Western allies themselves, and America's role is far less predominant today than it was after World War II. Far from being a negative indication of diminished U.S. influence, these changes are the best possible evidence that our policies have worked. While the United States is not the major source of resources for European political, economic, and military strength, America plays a unique role as a catalyst for cooperation.

> "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being...."
>
> Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty

The most significant development in the allied response to postwar challenges was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.[1] That document created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which many view as the most effective and enduring defensive alliance in modern history (see p. 2). NATO is a purely defensive alliance: it makes no territorial claims against any other nation, and its members have pledged to use their armed forces only to defend NATO territory. As NATO celebrates its 40th year in 1989, continued U.S.-allied consultations will lead to a comprehensive approach, not only to East-West issues but also to making the Western alliance stronger than ever as it meets the new challenges before it.

This pamphlet examines fundamental U.S. goals and objectives as NATO reevaluates and responds to a changing security climate.

[1]The original members of NATO were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States. The Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Spain, and Turkey joined later, bringing total NATO membership to 16. France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966 but remains a member of the alliance.

S 1. 71/6:

READEX FICHE best copy available

Political Relations

In a speech to European foreign ministers meeting in Vienna, Austria, on March 6, 1989, Secretary Baker outlined "four freedoms" which are embraced by the West as foundation stones for democracy and peaceful relations:

- The freedom of all Europeans to have a say in decisions which affect their lives, including freedom of the workplace: If the East were to accept this freedom, the legality of Poland's "Solidarity" trade union would have been the norm and not the subject of bitter negotiations.
- The freedom of all Europeans to express their political differences, when all ideas are welcome and human rights are truly inviolable: If the East were to accept this freedom, monitors of the Helsinki accords on human rights would not be persecuted by their governments.
- The freedom of all Europeans to exchange ideas and information and to exercise their right to freedom of movement: If the East were to accept these freedoms, academic researchers would never be denied access to scholarly documents—and the Berlin Wall would be reduced to rubble.
- The freedom of all Europeans to be safe, not only from military attack but from military intimidation as well: If the East were to accept this freedom, West Europeans would not face an overwhelming conventional military force to the East, and East Europeans would be able to make their own political decisions without fear of being "over-ruled" by Soviet tanks, as happened in Hungary and East Germany in 1956 as well as Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Steadfast dedication to these four principles, fueled by the vigor of free market economies and close cooperation with the United States, allowed Western Europe to rebuild via the Marshall Plan from the rubble of World War II faster than the most optimistic planners imagined. As a result, some power and influence has shifted from the United States to the West European allies. This development is both positive and desirable. Yet it poses new challenges as the United States and its allies explore ways to share both the benefits and burdens of collective defense.

West Europeans have become used to seeing the United States contribute a large share of the cost of collective defense. However, as West European economies now challenge U.S. business interests here and around the world, Americans argue that Western Europe is capable of paying a greater share of the common defense. The fact that the Western alliance continues to grow stronger even while debating such fundamental issues is the best proof that the democratic sharing of ideas is the only guarantee of durable peace and friendship.

Indeed, because NATO is made up of flourishing democracies, public opinion in many nations must be taken into account before critical political, economic, and military decisions are made. For example, the December 1987 U.S.-Soviet treaty to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) was made possible because, despite Soviet maneuvering, the people of several West European democracies made decisions to deploy INF forces in the first place. This concerted action by the allies in effect forced Moscow's hand, since prior to the deployment of Western INF forces, the Soviets held a monopoly on such weaponry and saw no reason to negotiate seriously. Key decisions on allied security as well as political and economic relations must stand up to public scrutiny in all 16 NATO democracies.

The Western allies have long understood that their own freedom and well-being is best protected only if they maintain an effective deterrent and if they can secure certain understandings with the East. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which first met in Helsinki in 1972, has been seeking to address the matrix of political and military issues that contribute to instability in Europe. Followup meetings in what has come to be known as the "CSCE process" have been scheduled on subjects as varied as human rights, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and environmental issues (see p. 3).

NATO'S 40 Years: A Chronology

May 1945: Germany surrenders; U.S., British, French, and Soviet troops occupy Germany.

June 1947: United States announces Marshall Plan for European economic recovery, starts pulling troops out of Europe but leaves 40,000 in Germany.

June 1948: Soviets start Berlin blockade by blocking roads to West Berlin.

April 4, 1949: The United States and 11 other countries sign the North Atlantic Treaty, creating NATO (Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982).

May 1949: Soviets end Berlin blockade. West Germany (and later East Germany) are created from occupation zones.

October 1950: NATO is formally established after the Korean war begins. Paris is its first headquarters.

May 1955: The Warsaw Pact is created.

August 1961: The Berlin Wall is built.

October 1962: Cuban missile crisis puts NATO and the Warsaw Pact on full military alert.

July 1966: France withdraws from the NATO military command; NATO begins moving headquarters to Brussels.

October 1967: NATO adopts its "flexible response" strategy.

October 1977: West Germany asks NATO to take action in response to Soviet deployment of SS–20 INF missiles.

December 1979: NATO adopts its "dual-track" policy of deploying its own INF missiles while negotiating with the Soviets for removal of their SS–20s.

1983–88: NATO unilaterally withdraws 2,400 nuclear warheads deployed with SNF weaponry in Europe.

November 1983: Pershing II INF missiles are sent to West Germany; Soviets walk out of INF talks.

March 1985: U.S.-Soviet INF talks resume.

December 1987: United States and U.S.S.R. sign INF Treaty abolishing this entire class of nuclear weapons from their respective arsenals.

March 1989: NATO and Warsaw Pact begin talks on conventional forces in Europe and confidence- and security-building measures.

May 1989: NATO summit and new CFE/SNF proposal.

June 1989: START talks resume.

Nuclear Arms Control

In the immediate postwar period, Europe's military balance was fluid and marked by Soviet attempts to impose Moscow's will on other governments. U.S. strategic, or long-range, nuclear weapons served as a counterweight to the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional forces. After 1948, the Soviet Union's development of nuclear weapons posed an additional threat to Europe and the United States.

Short-range nuclear weaponry appeared on both sides, and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact troops and armor continued to numerically overwhelm those of the West. This was a critical factor in allied defense strategy because NATO's largest military power, the United States (thousands of miles away from the East-West frontier), was unable to quickly deploy conventional forces to Europe.

In response to the Soviet bloc's massive military buildup, NATO in 1967 adopted and continues to follow a strategy known as "flexible response." NATO is prepared to use any of the weapons at its disposal to appropriately counter any act of aggression. The Warsaw Pact must weigh the possibility that NATO could use any of its resources—including nuclear weapons—if Warsaw Pact forces invade Western Europe. This flexibility is aimed at deterring war by sending the other side an unmistakable message that the West will take appropriate action to deal with any form of aggression.

The Soviet Union, for its own propaganda advantage, often attempts to misrepresent NATO's "flexible response" strategy and our efforts to deter war. For example, Moscow would like us to renounce first-use of nuclear weapons and even to turn Europe into a "nuclear free zone." In the past, Moscow also has suggested a "freeze" on nuclear forces at current levels. The true nature of these Soviet arguments becomes clear when one considers that, in the absence of a credible nuclear deterrent, Warsaw Pact conventional forces would dominate the European security environment. Moreover, even should equal conventional force levels be achieved, history has shown that conventional forces alone do not prevent war. It is NATO's strategy of deterrence, made credible by a mix of up-to-date nuclear and conventional weapons, which has guaranteed the peace in Europe for the last 40 years.

For this reason, the United States and its allies have approached the question of nuclear arms control from an overall perspective of Western *security*. Reducing nuclear arms is *not* an end in itself; rather, enhancing Western security and regional stability is our goal. Western conventional arms control proposals are aimed at eliminating the conventional forces imbalance and enhancing stability.

There are three basic categories of land-based nuclear missiles: short-range nuclear forces (SNF) with a range of less than 500 kilometers (300 miles), intermediate-range (INF) with a range of 500–5,500 kilometers (300–3,400 miles), and long-range or strategic—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—with a range of more than 5,500 kilometers (3,400 miles).

CSCE Followup Meetings, March 1989–91

1989	Date	Location
CSBMs	March 9–	Vienna, Austria
Information	April 18–May 12	London, England
Human Rights	May 30–June 23	Paris, France
Environment	October 16–November 3	Sofia, Bulgaria
1990		
Economics	March 19–April 6	Bonn, West Germany
Human Rights	June 5–29	Copenhagen, Denmark
Mediterranean	September 24–October 19	Palma, Spain
1991		
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes	January 15–February 8	Valletta, Malta
Cultural Heritage	May 28–June 7	Krakow, Poland
Human Rights	September 10–October 4	Moscow, U.S.S.R.

The only category of nuclear missiles that has been banned completely by the United States and the U.S.S.R. is INF. The Soviet Union began deploying ground-launched missiles capable of reaching West European targets during the 1950s. The most dangerous of these INF weapons were the modern SS–20 missiles which the Soviets began deploying in 1977. The allies then joined in a "dual track" approach on INF—deploying new INF weapons to counter the Soviet threat while at the same time pursuing negotiations with the Soviets for elimination of the SS–20s and other Soviet INF missiles. Faced with U.S. deployments of INF missiles, the U.S.S.R. agreed to a U.S. proposal for a fully verifiable ban on intermediate-range weapons.

Strategic nuclear forces are the subject of the strategic arms reduction talks (START) aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. objective in START is to achieve an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement that creates a more stable nuclear balance, thereby reducing the incentive for either side to launch a first strike. The United States believes that a START treaty is possible in the future, but not before several difficult issues are resolved. These include: mobile ICBMs, sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, and sublimits on ICBM warheads. In many of these cases, verification presents the most difficult challenge.

NATO continues to face the direct threat posed to Europe by large numbers of Warsaw Pact short-range nuclear missiles, which recently have been substantially upgraded. As agreed to in the May 1989 NATO report, "A Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament,"[2] NATO reaffirms its position that for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the alliance's strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces. Land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear systems in Western Europe, including ground-based missiles, will be needed and continue to be updated where necessary. In line with NATO's commitment to maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to support this strategy, NATO already has made unilateral cuts in short-range nuclear forces. The number of land-based warheads in Western Europe has been reduced by more than one-third since 1979 to its lowest level in more than 20 years. Updating such systems would result in further reductions.

[2]For texts of "A Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament" and the NATO final declaration, see Selected Documents No. 37, "The NATO Summit: 40 Years of Success."



Conventional Arms Control

President Bush and Secretary Baker consider conventional forces to be a high priority area in arms control. Secretary Baker has defined the issue quite simply: "A vast force, spearheaded by heavily armored units and supported by massive firepower, has been fielded by the Soviet Union and its allies. That force points West." Warsaw Pact tank and artillery forces outnumber NATO 3 to 1 and the Warsaw Pact holds a 2:1 advantage in armored personnel carriers. Even if all the unilateral force reductions announced by General Secretary Gorbachev and the Warsaw Pact were implemented, the pact would still hold more than a 2:1 edge in tanks and artillery.

On March 9, 1989, two new autonomous negotiations within the framework of the CSCE process opened in Vienna. The Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) covers the European territory of all Warsaw Pact and NATO countries from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Separate Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) involving all 35 CSCE nations aim to build "openness" between East and West.

CFE. During the NATO summit meeting on May 29, 1989, President Bush asked the allies to join in tabling the most far-reaching Western conventional arms control proposal ever offered in the postwar era. The President has proposed and NATO has endorsed the following enhancements to NATO's CFE proposal now on the table in Vienna:

- First, that the members of the alliance lock in Eastern acceptance of the proposed Western limits on key portions of their ground forces. This includes ceilings on numbers of tanks (20,000 for each side), armored troop carriers (28,000 for each side), and artillery pieces (16,500–24,000 for each side, depending on the resolution of definitional questions). Equipment reduced would be destroyed. This provision would oblige the East to destroy tens of thousands of weapon systems and eliminate its preponderance in these important components of military strength.
- Second, that the West expand its proposal to extend, for the first time, the concept of conventional arms control to all land-based combat aircraft and helicopters in the Atlantic to the Urals area. Each side would be obliged to reduce its holdings to a level 15% below the current NATO total. All reduced equipment

would be destroyed. Again, although both sides would take significant cuts, the East would lose its current preponderance in these forces.

• Third, that the United States and Soviet Union agree to a common level of approximately 275,000 ground and air forces stationed outside national territory in the Atlantic-to-the Urals zone. The United States is willing to reduce its combat forces by 20% to arrive at this level. The reduction to parity would require the Soviets to reduce their 600,000-member force in Eastern Europe by 325,000. Withdrawn forces on both sides would be demobilized.

• Fourth, that both sides accelerate their timetable for reaching a CFE agreement along the above lines and for implementing the required reductions. The Soviet Union has referred to a target date of 1997 as its goal; the United States would like to reach an agreement within 6 months to 1 year and accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993.

NATO has set a goal of tabling these enhancements along with verification provisions at the opening of Round III of CFE on September 7, 1989. As the Soviet Union and its allies indicate their readiness to change their national priorities and reduce their enormous military establishments, the United States and its allies are prepared to help realize the longstanding hope of a secure and less militarized Europe.

The Western allies have four major objectives in CFE:

• The establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. The present concentration of conventional forces between the Atlantic and the Urals represents the greatest destructive potential of conventional forces ever assembled. The mere presence of such massive firepower threatens European security.

• The elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security. It is the substantial disparity of tanks, artillery, and troop carriers that most threatens European stability and security. In particular, no single country should be allowed to possess more than a fixed proportion of all weapons systems held by all parties. Additional limits should be placed on the stationing of troops on another country's territory (such as Soviet forces in East Germany). These two elements would combine to ensure that no one country could dominate Europe by force of arms.

• The elimination of capabilities to launch surprise attacks and large-scale offensive operations. The types of weapons systems in which the Soviet bloc enjoys the greatest advantage—tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers—are systems that are most vital to seizing and holding territory, the prime aim of any aggressor.

• The United States insists that any arms control treaty be effectively verifiable and that inspection be expanded.

CSBMs. CSBMs are designed to reduce the risk for armed conflict that arises through misunderstanding or miscalculation of military capabilities and intentions in Europe. After successful conclusion of the 1986 Stockholm agreement and the 2½-year implementation experience, the 35 CSCE participating states are meeting again in Vienna to develop additional measures. The focus of the Western proposal is for measures which increase openness and transparency of military structure, equipment, and activities, thus reducing the likelihood that weapons will ever be used.

A Look Toward the Future

Economic, social, and political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are occurring at the same time that allied economies and democracies are flourishing. New horizons are now evident for a continent that was divided 40 years ago by a conflict between two opposing visions. As that conflict abates, it may be possible to remove old obstacles from Europe's path to the future.

The United States and its NATO allies are working in concert to remove the largest of those obstacles—especially the conventional force imbalances and curtains of secrecy that have long imperiled European security and world peace. This process will not be easy, but it will help clear the path toward a free, open, secure, and prosperous Europe. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • June 1989
Editor: Colleen Lutz • This material is in the public domain and may be reprinted without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.

PA/OAP, Rm. 5815A
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520–6810

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300

Address Correction Requested

BULK RATE
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
U.S. Department of State
Permit No. G–130